Yearly $10M Loss in Revenue Triggers Governance Dispute, Aave Labs Accused of 'DAO Treachery'
Original Article Title: Who Owns 'Aave': Aave Labs vs Aave DAO
Original Article Author: Ignas, Crypto KOL
Original Article Translation: Felix, PANews
Recently, Aave Labs and Aave DAO engaged in a heated debate surrounding the fee allocation issue stemming from the CoWSwap integration. This debate has also been seen by the community as a potential crisis in DeFi governance. The author of this article interprets this debate from a neutral perspective, and the following details the content.
On December 4th, the lending protocol Aave Labs switched the default exchange integration of its front-end interface aave.com from ParaSwap to CoWSwap. While this may seem like a minor product update, it actually exposed a deep-seated conflict within Aave.
This conflict is not about CowSwap, fees, or user experience, but about ownership. Specifically, it is about who controls Aave, who decides on allocation, and who captures the value created around the protocol.
In the previous setup, the exchange feature primarily served the purpose of user retention:
Users could rearrange or exchange assets without leaving the Aave interface. Importantly, all referral fees or positive slippage surplus fees were redistributed as revenue to the Aave DAO treasury.
CowSwap's integration changed this dynamic.
According to Aave's documentation, exchanges now incur a fee of approximately 15 to 25 basis points. Orbit on behalf of EzR3aL (Note: a senior governance participant of Aave DAO and an independent delegate) investigated the destination of these fees and concluded: these fees no longer flow into the DAO treasury but instead into an address controlled by Aave Labs.
"Assuming a mere 200,000 USD is transferred weekly, the DAO loses at least 10 million USD per year." — EzR3aL
Did Aave Labs unilaterally sever the DAO's revenue source and transfer it to a private company?
Aave has successfully operated over the years because despite the blurred lines of responsibilities, all parties' interests remained aligned.
· DAO Governance Protocol
· Aave Labs Building Frontend Interface
Funds mostly flowed in one direction, so nobody paid much attention to defining the issue.
But now, it seems this tacit coordination has been broken.
As Aave founder and CEO Stani.eth wrote:
· "At the time, Aave Labs decided to donate to the Aave DAO in those cases (funds that could also be returned to users)"
Aave Labs' response: "The protocol and the product are different concepts."
A response from Aave Labs on the forum:
· "The frontend interface is operated by Aave Labs, entirely independent from the protocol and DAO management."
· "The frontend interface is a product, not a protocol component."
From their perspective, this is normal. Running a frontend requires funds, security requires funds, and support also requires funds.
The surplus from Paraswap flowing to the DAO is not a permanent rule. There is no precedent to follow.
ACI (a service provider serving the Aave DAO) and its founder Marc Zeller believe this is an issue of trust.
"Every service provider on the Aave DAO payroll has a mandatory fiduciary obligation to the DAO, and thus to the best interest of AAVE token holders." —Marc Zeller in a forum comment.
He believes there was an understanding: the DAO lends its brand and intellectual property, so the frontend's profits should also belong to the DAO. "It seems we have been fooled for a long time, thinking this was a given."
Marc Zeller also claims that the DAO has lost income, and routing decisions could push volume to competitors, resulting in Aave DAO losing about 10% of potential income.
Protocol vs. Product
Aave Labs has drawn a clear line between protocol and product.
The DAO manages the protocol and its on-chain economy. Aave Labs operates the frontend interface as an independent product with its own vision.
Just as explained by the Aave founder in this tweet:
· Aave Labs' frontend interface is a product that fully embodies our own principles, which we have been developing for over 8 years, similar to other interfaces using the Aave protocol, such as DeFi Saver.
· It is completely reasonable for Aave Labs to profit from its product, especially since it does not touch the protocol itself, and given the ByBit security incident, this ensures secure access to the protocol.
The Aave DAO does not own intellectual property rights because a DAO is not a legal entity and cannot hold trademarks or enforce them in court.

The DAO manages the smart contracts and on-chain parameters of the Aave protocol, but does not manage the brand itself.
However, the DAO has been granted a license to use the Aave brand and visual identity for protocol-related purposes. Past governance proposals have explicitly granted the DAO broad rights to use the visual identity for "the benefit of the Aave protocol, Aave ecosystem, and Aave DAO."

Source: Aave
As EzR3aL puts it:
"The reason why charging this fee is feasible is because the Aave brand is well-known and accepted in the ecosystem. This is the brand that the Aave DAO paid for."
The value of the Aave brand does not originate from a logo.
Its value comes from:
· The DAO prudently managing risk
· Token holders bearing protocol risk
· The DAO paying fees to service providers
· The DAO surviving multiple crises without collapsing
· The protocol earning a reputation for being secure and reliable
This is what EzR3aL refers to as the "brand that the DAO paid for."
It's not a legal sense of payment, but an economic sense of payment, involving funds, governance, risk, and time.
Does this sound familiar?
Once again, it came back to the issue of Uniswap Labs and the Foundation regarding a similar matter about Uniswap's front-end fee. Ultimately, Uniswap restructured the equity and tokenholder rights, completely eliminating the front-end fee.
This is why the Equity/DAO dynamic can be harmful (as I discovered from the Telegram group chat).

The content in the image is as follows:
“The Equity issued a token and distributed these tokens to themselves and others. If the DAO generates a profit, Equity can receive a share of the profit through the tokens it holds in the DAO.
· However, Equity does not bear the product's losses, which are borne by the DAO.
· Equity also does not manage risk; risk management is the responsibility of the DAO.
Users do not directly interact with the ‘contract’ but with a specific implementation version that has specific risk parameters and liquidity tied to that specific implementation.
If Equity wants to earn additional returns beyond the profit generated from the tokens it initially minted and distributed to itself, everyone agrees it is free to develop a standalone product to provide services to users, just like DeFi Saver is a standalone product that charges for its unique services.
Access to a product should not be restricted to a single front end.”
At the time of writing, Aave Labs only acknowledged the critics' viewpoint on communication.
· What is genuinely valid criticism here is the communication or rather lack thereof.
Things were complicated enough, and now they are even worse.
Aave Labs proposed Horizon as a dedicated RWA instance.
Initially, the proposal included something that immediately raised concerns within the DAO: a new token with a diminishing profit share.
Representatives of various factions strongly opposed this (including the author), believing that introducing a separate token would dilute AAVE's value proposition and disrupt consensus.
The DAO emerged victorious, and Aave Labs was forced to concede. The new token plan was scrapped.
But this has sparked even greater division.
Despite numerous concerns (one of which specifically points out the clear responsibilities of Aave Labs versus the DAO), Horizon still went live. This was the most controversial vote to win.

I voted against deployment, advocating for a friendly agreement to avoid future conflict escalation. And that is exactly the current situation. The economic issue rapidly became the focal point of the conflict.
According to data cited by Marc Zeller, so far, Horizon has generated about $100,000 in total revenue, while the Aave DAO has put in $500,000 of incentive funds, making its net assets approximately -$400,000.
And this is not even taking into account other factors.
Marc also points out that tens of millions of GHO tokens have been invested in Horizon, but the earnings are insufficient to cover the costs required to maintain the GHO pegged price.
If these opportunity costs are factored in, the DAO's true economic situation could be even worse.
This prompted ACI to raise an issue beyond Horizon itself:
If a project funded by a DAO has directly poor economic performance, is that the whole story?
Or, are there additional benefits, integration fees, or off-chain arrangements that token holders are not seeing?
Over the years, deployments and plans proposed by various Labs have ultimately led to the DAO's costs exceeding its returns.

A few days after Aave Labs proposed a DAO motion to deploy Aave V3 on MegaETH, discussions on the matter ensued.
In return, "Aave Labs will receive 30 million points from MegaETH."
Then, "These points may be distributed as incentives on the Aave V3 MegaETH market following Aave DAO's GTM strategy."
The issue lies in the transparency and ensuring that incentives are distributed as agreed upon when a product is operated by a private entity using DAO-backed assets.

Source: Aave
The surprising aspect of this proposal has another reason:
The Aave DAO has collaborated with multiple service providers, especially ACI, proposing deployment on MegaETH as early as March. Relevant discussions are still ongoing.

Source: Aave
As Marc commented on the forum:
“During the discussion, we were very surprised to find that Aave Labs decided to bypass all precedents, abandon all ongoing progress, and reach out directly to MegaETH. We only learned of this when the proposal was posted on the forum.”
Treasury
Another part of this debate concerns the Aave Treasury.
The Aave Treasury is an application-level product built and funded by Aave Labs. Technically, they are ERC-4626 Treasury Wrappers built on top of the Aave protocol to abstract position management for users.
Stani explained this very clearly:
“The Aave Treasury is just a 4626 Treasury Wrapper built and funded by Aave Labs.”
From the perspective of Aave Labs, this should not be controversial.
The Treasuries are not protocol components. They do not affect the protocol's revenue.

They are optional, and users can always interact directly with the Aave markets or use third-party Treasuries.
· “For Aave V4, this Treasury is not mandatory… Users can interact with Aave V4 directly through Hubs.”
And since Treasuries are products, Aave Labs believes they are entitled to profit from them.
· “Aave Labs profiting from their products is entirely fine, especially since they do not involve the protocol itself.”
So why was the Treasury involved in this dispute?
The reason lies in the distribution channel.
If the Treasury becomes the default user experience of Aave V4, then a Labs-owned, Aave-branded product could serve as a bridge between users and the protocol, leveraging the reputation, liquidity, and trust built on the DAO to collect transaction fees.
Despite the increasing adoption of Aave's products, the AAVE token would still be impacted.
Once again, the author believes this issue falls into the same category as the dispute between Uniswap Labs and the Foundation regarding front-end products.
In summary, CowSwap, Horizon, MegaETH, and Aave Vaults all face the same issue.
Aave Labs sees itself as an independent builder, operating a subjective product on a neutral protocol.
The DAO increasingly perceives that the protocol's value is being realized beyond its direct control.
The Aave DAO does not own intellectual property, but it is authorized to use the Aave brand and visual identity for protocol-related purposes.
This dispute is crucial because the upcoming Aave v4 release is explicitly aimed at shifting complexity from the user side to the abstraction layer.
More routes, more automation, and more products between users and the core protocol.
More abstraction means more control over user experience, and user experience control is crucial for value creation/extraction.
This article strives to remain neutral. However, it is hoped that consensus can be reached regarding value capture for $AAVE token holders.
The consensus the author hopes to achieve is not only beneficial for Aave itself but also because Aave has set an important precedent for how equity and tokens can coexist.
Uniswap Labs has already gone through this process, ultimately benefiting $UNI holders.
Aave should do the same.
You may also like

1 billion DOTs were minted out of thin air, but the hacker only made 230,000 dollars

After the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, when will the war end?

Before using Musk's "Western WeChat" X Chat, you need to understand these three questions
The X Chat will be available for download on the App Store this Friday. The media has already covered the feature list, including self-destructing messages, screenshot prevention, 481-person group chats, Grok integration, and registration without a phone number, positioning it as the "Western WeChat." However, there are three questions that have hardly been addressed in any reports.
There is a sentence on X's official help page that is still hanging there: "If malicious insiders or X itself cause encrypted conversations to be exposed through legal processes, both the sender and receiver will be completely unaware."
No. The difference lies in where the keys are stored.
In Signal's end-to-end encryption, the keys never leave your device. X, the court, or any external party does not hold your keys. Signal's servers have nothing to decrypt your messages; even if they were subpoenaed, they could only provide registration timestamps and last connection times, as evidenced by past subpoena records.
X Chat uses the Juicebox protocol. This solution divides the key into three parts, each stored on three servers operated by X. When recovering the key with a PIN code, the system retrieves these three shards from X's servers and recombines them. No matter how complex the PIN code is, X is the actual custodian of the key, not the user.
This is the technical background of the "help page sentence": because the key is on X's servers, X has the ability to respond to legal processes without the user's knowledge. Signal does not have this capability, not because of policy, but because it simply does not have the key.
The following illustration compares the security mechanisms of Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and X Chat along six dimensions. X Chat is the only one of the four where the platform holds the key and the only one without Forward Secrecy.
The significance of Forward Secrecy is that even if a key is compromised at a certain point in time, historical messages cannot be decrypted because each message has a unique key. Signal's Double Ratchet protocol automatically updates the key after each message, a mechanism lacking in X Chat.
After analyzing the X Chat architecture in June 2025, Johns Hopkins University cryptology professor Matthew Green commented, "If we judge XChat as an end-to-end encryption scheme, this seems like a pretty game-over type of vulnerability." He later added, "I would not trust this any more than I trust current unencrypted DMs."
From a September 2025 TechCrunch report to being live in April 2026, this architecture saw no changes.
In a February 9, 2026 tweet, Musk pledged to undergo rigorous security tests of X Chat before its launch on X Chat and to open source all the code.
As of the April 17 launch date, no independent third-party audit has been completed, there is no official code repository on GitHub, the App Store's privacy label reveals X Chat collects five or more categories of data including location, contact info, and search history, directly contradicting the marketing claim of "No Ads, No Trackers."
Not continuous monitoring, but a clear access point.
For every message on X Chat, users can long-press and select "Ask Grok." When this button is clicked, the message is delivered to Grok in plaintext, transitioning from encrypted to unencrypted at this stage.
This design is not a vulnerability but a feature. However, X Chat's privacy policy does not state whether this plaintext data will be used for Grok's model training or if Grok will store this conversation content. By actively clicking "Ask Grok," users are voluntarily removing the encryption protection of that message.
There is also a structural issue: How quickly will this button shift from an "optional feature" to a "default habit"? The higher the quality of Grok's replies, the more frequently users will rely on it, leading to an increase in the proportion of messages flowing out of encryption protection. The actual encryption strength of X Chat, in the long run, depends not only on the design of the Juicebox protocol but also on the frequency of user clicks on "Ask Grok."
X Chat's initial release only supports iOS, with the Android version simply stating "coming soon" without a timeline.
In the global smartphone market, Android holds about 73%, while iOS holds about 27% (IDC/Statista, 2025). Of WhatsApp's 3.14 billion monthly active users, 73% are on Android (according to Demand Sage). In India, WhatsApp covers 854 million users, with over 95% Android penetration. In Brazil, there are 148 million users, with 81% on Android, and in Indonesia, there are 112 million users, with 87% on Android.
WhatsApp's dominance in the global communication market is built on Android. Signal, with a monthly active user base of around 85 million, also relies mainly on privacy-conscious users in Android-dominant countries.
X Chat circumvented this battlefield, with two possible interpretations. One is technical debt; X Chat is built with Rust, and achieving cross-platform support is not easy, so prioritizing iOS may be an engineering constraint. The other is a strategic choice; with iOS holding a market share of nearly 55% in the U.S., X's core user base being in the U.S., prioritizing iOS means focusing on their core user base rather than engaging in direct competition with Android-dominated emerging markets and WhatsApp.
These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, leading to the same result: X Chat's debut saw it willingly forfeit 73% of the global smartphone user base.
This matter has been described by some: X Chat, along with X Money and Grok, forms a trifecta creating a closed-loop data system parallel to the existing infrastructure, similar in concept to the WeChat ecosystem. This assessment is not new, but with X Chat's launch, it's worth revisiting the schematic.
X Chat generates communication metadata, including information on who is talking to whom, for how long, and how frequently. This data flows into X's identity system. Part of the message content goes through the Ask Grok feature and enters Grok's processing chain. Financial transactions are handled by X Money: external public testing was completed in March, opening to the public in April, enabling fiat peer-to-peer transfers via Visa Direct. A senior Fireblocks executive confirmed plans for cryptocurrency payments to go live by the end of the year, holding money transmitter licenses in over 40 U.S. states currently.
Every WeChat feature operates within China's regulatory framework. Musk's system operates within Western regulatory frameworks, but he also serves as the head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). This is not a WeChat replica; it is a reenactment of the same logic under different political conditions.
The difference is that WeChat has never explicitly claimed to be "end-to-end encrypted" on its main interface, whereas X Chat does. "End-to-end encryption" in user perception means that no one, not even the platform, can see your messages. X Chat's architectural design does not meet this user expectation, but it uses this term.
X Chat consolidates the three data lines of "who this person is, who they are talking to, and where their money comes from and goes to" in one company's hands.
The help page sentence has never been just technical instructions.

Parse Noise's newly launched Beta version, how to "on-chain" this heat?

Is Lobster a Thing of the Past? Unpacking the Hermes Agent Tools that Supercharge Your Throughput to 100x

Declare War on AI? The Doomsday Narrative Behind Ultraman's Residence in Flames

Crypto VCs Are Dead? The Market Extinction Cycle Has Begun

Claude's Journey to Foolishness in Diagrams: The Cost of Thriftiness, or How API Bill Increased 100-Fold

Edge Land Regress: A Rehash Around Maritime Power, Energy, and the Dollar

Arthur Hayes Latest Interview: How Should Retail Investors Navigate the Iran Conflict?

Just now, Sam Altman was attacked again, this time by gunfire

Straits Blockade, Stablecoin Recap | Rewire News Morning Edition

From High Expectations to Controversial Turnaround, Genius Airdrop Triggers Community Backlash

The Xiaomi electric vehicle factory in Beijing's Daxing district has become the new Jerusalem for the American elite

Lean Harness, Fat Skill: The Real Source of 100x AI Productivity

Ultraman is not afraid of his mansion being attacked; he has a fortress.

US-Iran Negotiations Collapse, Bitcoin Faces Battle to Defend $70,000 Level

Reflections and Confusions of a Crypto VC
1 billion DOTs were minted out of thin air, but the hacker only made 230,000 dollars
After the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, when will the war end?
Before using Musk's "Western WeChat" X Chat, you need to understand these three questions
The X Chat will be available for download on the App Store this Friday. The media has already covered the feature list, including self-destructing messages, screenshot prevention, 481-person group chats, Grok integration, and registration without a phone number, positioning it as the "Western WeChat." However, there are three questions that have hardly been addressed in any reports.
There is a sentence on X's official help page that is still hanging there: "If malicious insiders or X itself cause encrypted conversations to be exposed through legal processes, both the sender and receiver will be completely unaware."
No. The difference lies in where the keys are stored.
In Signal's end-to-end encryption, the keys never leave your device. X, the court, or any external party does not hold your keys. Signal's servers have nothing to decrypt your messages; even if they were subpoenaed, they could only provide registration timestamps and last connection times, as evidenced by past subpoena records.
X Chat uses the Juicebox protocol. This solution divides the key into three parts, each stored on three servers operated by X. When recovering the key with a PIN code, the system retrieves these three shards from X's servers and recombines them. No matter how complex the PIN code is, X is the actual custodian of the key, not the user.
This is the technical background of the "help page sentence": because the key is on X's servers, X has the ability to respond to legal processes without the user's knowledge. Signal does not have this capability, not because of policy, but because it simply does not have the key.
The following illustration compares the security mechanisms of Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and X Chat along six dimensions. X Chat is the only one of the four where the platform holds the key and the only one without Forward Secrecy.
The significance of Forward Secrecy is that even if a key is compromised at a certain point in time, historical messages cannot be decrypted because each message has a unique key. Signal's Double Ratchet protocol automatically updates the key after each message, a mechanism lacking in X Chat.
After analyzing the X Chat architecture in June 2025, Johns Hopkins University cryptology professor Matthew Green commented, "If we judge XChat as an end-to-end encryption scheme, this seems like a pretty game-over type of vulnerability." He later added, "I would not trust this any more than I trust current unencrypted DMs."
From a September 2025 TechCrunch report to being live in April 2026, this architecture saw no changes.
In a February 9, 2026 tweet, Musk pledged to undergo rigorous security tests of X Chat before its launch on X Chat and to open source all the code.
As of the April 17 launch date, no independent third-party audit has been completed, there is no official code repository on GitHub, the App Store's privacy label reveals X Chat collects five or more categories of data including location, contact info, and search history, directly contradicting the marketing claim of "No Ads, No Trackers."
Not continuous monitoring, but a clear access point.
For every message on X Chat, users can long-press and select "Ask Grok." When this button is clicked, the message is delivered to Grok in plaintext, transitioning from encrypted to unencrypted at this stage.
This design is not a vulnerability but a feature. However, X Chat's privacy policy does not state whether this plaintext data will be used for Grok's model training or if Grok will store this conversation content. By actively clicking "Ask Grok," users are voluntarily removing the encryption protection of that message.
There is also a structural issue: How quickly will this button shift from an "optional feature" to a "default habit"? The higher the quality of Grok's replies, the more frequently users will rely on it, leading to an increase in the proportion of messages flowing out of encryption protection. The actual encryption strength of X Chat, in the long run, depends not only on the design of the Juicebox protocol but also on the frequency of user clicks on "Ask Grok."
X Chat's initial release only supports iOS, with the Android version simply stating "coming soon" without a timeline.
In the global smartphone market, Android holds about 73%, while iOS holds about 27% (IDC/Statista, 2025). Of WhatsApp's 3.14 billion monthly active users, 73% are on Android (according to Demand Sage). In India, WhatsApp covers 854 million users, with over 95% Android penetration. In Brazil, there are 148 million users, with 81% on Android, and in Indonesia, there are 112 million users, with 87% on Android.
WhatsApp's dominance in the global communication market is built on Android. Signal, with a monthly active user base of around 85 million, also relies mainly on privacy-conscious users in Android-dominant countries.
X Chat circumvented this battlefield, with two possible interpretations. One is technical debt; X Chat is built with Rust, and achieving cross-platform support is not easy, so prioritizing iOS may be an engineering constraint. The other is a strategic choice; with iOS holding a market share of nearly 55% in the U.S., X's core user base being in the U.S., prioritizing iOS means focusing on their core user base rather than engaging in direct competition with Android-dominated emerging markets and WhatsApp.
These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, leading to the same result: X Chat's debut saw it willingly forfeit 73% of the global smartphone user base.
This matter has been described by some: X Chat, along with X Money and Grok, forms a trifecta creating a closed-loop data system parallel to the existing infrastructure, similar in concept to the WeChat ecosystem. This assessment is not new, but with X Chat's launch, it's worth revisiting the schematic.
X Chat generates communication metadata, including information on who is talking to whom, for how long, and how frequently. This data flows into X's identity system. Part of the message content goes through the Ask Grok feature and enters Grok's processing chain. Financial transactions are handled by X Money: external public testing was completed in March, opening to the public in April, enabling fiat peer-to-peer transfers via Visa Direct. A senior Fireblocks executive confirmed plans for cryptocurrency payments to go live by the end of the year, holding money transmitter licenses in over 40 U.S. states currently.
Every WeChat feature operates within China's regulatory framework. Musk's system operates within Western regulatory frameworks, but he also serves as the head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). This is not a WeChat replica; it is a reenactment of the same logic under different political conditions.
The difference is that WeChat has never explicitly claimed to be "end-to-end encrypted" on its main interface, whereas X Chat does. "End-to-end encryption" in user perception means that no one, not even the platform, can see your messages. X Chat's architectural design does not meet this user expectation, but it uses this term.
X Chat consolidates the three data lines of "who this person is, who they are talking to, and where their money comes from and goes to" in one company's hands.
The help page sentence has never been just technical instructions.
